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Abstract 
 
We review the ability of the ex post internal rate of return (IRR) to detect monopoly 
profits.  When market values are used as entry and exit values, the ex post IRR simply 
reveals whether the firm did better or worse than the market expected at the entry date.  It 
says nothing about monopoly profits.  When replacement costs are used as entry and exit 
values, the ex post IRR can, in principle, reveal something about monopoly profits.  
However, since the ex post IRR is a noisy measure of ex ante monopoly profits, it will be 
very difficult to reject the null hypothesis given the sample periods typically available.  
The benchmarks typically used are market-determined, and therefore only comparable to 
IRRs calculated using market values – a situation when the ex post IRR reveals nothing 
about monopoly profits anyway.  Furthermore, there is ample empirical and theoretical 
evidence that these benchmarks do not even represent fair rates of return. 
Can Ex Post Rates of Return Detect
Monopoly Profits?
The IRR approach
Recently ex post rates of return have been advanced as a means of detecting monopoly
proﬁt-making by airports (Bertram, Dempster and Terry, 2000), electricity lines compa-
nies (Bertram and Terry, 2000), gas networks (Bertram et al., 2001), and ports (Bertram
et al., 2002). These authors calculate a measure of the ex post rate of return earned
by hypothetical investors who purchased an asset at a particular date t, received all the
cashﬂows generated by the asset over a subsequent period of length s, and sold the asset
at the exit date t + s. They present their return as an internal rate of return (IRR),
although other approaches (for example, averaging annual returns over the same period)
that provide essentially the same answer are also possible.1
These IRRs are compared with several benchmark returns. Because the ex post IRRs
exceed the benchmarks, the authors claim that the ﬁrms under study must be earning
monopoly proﬁts.
Is this approach reasonable? That is, can we infer anything about monopoly proﬁts
from IRR calculations? As Marsden (2002) points out, the choice of entry and exit values
is critical to answering this question. Three possible entry values come to mind.
• The hypothetical investor could purchase the asset as a going concern at date t, in
which case the cost is the date t market value of the asset.
• Alternatively, the hypothetical investor could build an identical asset at date t, in
which case the relevant cost is the date t replacement cost of the asset.
• Finally, the entry cost could be the historical cost of the asset, adjusted for depre-
ciation up to date t.
The papers cited above seem to adopt the ﬁrst approach. In the study of gas pipelines,
the hypothetical investor buys shares at the time of ﬂotation,2 while in the study of port
companies the “initial outlay corresponds to the amount which a hypothetical investor
would have had to spend to acquire each port at the time of corporatisation.” (Bertram
et al. 2002, p. 10).
1As a measure of ex ante performance, the IRR calculation has several well-known problems (see, for
example, Ross et al., 1993, pp. 165–175); we ignore these here.
2“[A] hypothetical investor purchases one notional share in NGC at the time of ﬂotation” (Bertram et
al. 2001, p. 10), where a notional share is deﬁned to be one-eleventh of a bundle comprising one ordinary
share and ten convertible capital notes. Similarly, the hypothetical investor in Enerco buys one “notional”
share at the time of ﬂotation in April 1992 (Bertram et al. 2001, p. 15).
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An identical range of choices also exists for exit values. In general, it seems reasonable
to require that the choice of entry and exit values be consistent, i.e., both values are market
prices, or both are replacement costs, or both are adjusted historical costs. However, the
issues outlined below exist regardless of which combination we use.
In the next two sections, we explain exactly what the IRR approach can (and cannot)
tell us about monopoly proﬁts. We consider in turn the cases where entry and exit values
are (i) market prices and (ii) replacement costs.
IRR, monopoly profits, and market entry and exit values
Consider ﬁrst the case where the IRR is calculated using market entry and exit values. In
an informationally-eﬃcient market, assets are priced in such a way that investors expect
to earn a ‘fair’ rate of return.3 Sometimes a ﬁrm will perform better than the market
expected, and the ex post return will exceed this fair rate of return; sometimes it will
under-perform relative to market expectations, and the ex post return will be less than
the fair rate of return. Therefore, when the entry and exit values are market values, the
ex post IRR simply reveals whether the ﬁrm did better or worse than the market expected
at the entry date. Anticipated monopoly proﬁts just lead to a high market value now,
not to returns being high over any given future period. For the latter to occur, the ﬁrm
must convince the market that proﬁt forecasts need to rise, e.g., by achieving earnings
surprises. By deﬁnition, a ‘surprise’ is no more likely to be generated by a monopolist
than by a competitive ﬁrm, so one cannot infer monopoly power from market rates of
return.
Consider, for example, Bertram et al.’s analysis of port companies. The authors note
that when they changed hands in 1988, the ports’ valuations “approximately matched
the anticipated net present value of each business.” (Bertram et al. 2002, p. 3) However,
“[a]ctual volume growth exceeded expectations and resulted in windfall revenues for many
ports.” If the valuers had anticipated this volume growth, they would have set higher
values at the purchase date. In turn, this would have resulted in lower ex post IRRs. Pre-
sumably Bertram et al. would not then be claiming that port companies made monopoly
proﬁts, despite the fact that both actual proﬁt ﬂows and the original investment in the
assets are unchanged. Essentially, port companies are being accused of making monopoly
proﬁts because valuers did not anticipate volume growth. Of course, the volume growth
may (or may not) have been due to unanticipated monopoly power, but this cannot be
inferred from a single average rate of return calculation.
3If markets are ineﬃcient, then ex post IRRs based on market prices reﬂect under- or over-pricing and
thus provide little information about economic performance. For example, an analysis of dotcom ﬁrms
at the end of 1999 would have produced very high IRRs, but, at least with the beneﬁt of hindsight, few
would see this as an indication of monopoly proﬁts.
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A market-based ex post rate of return cannot shed any light on the existence or
otherwise of monopoly proﬁts. A well-known example of this problem is the investment
folklore which advises investors to “buy land, they ain’t making any more of it.” But
all investors know that no more land is being produced, so they factor this piece of
information into the price of land. As a result, the price is bid up to the point where it
oﬀers its required return, regardless of whether or not the land is used for an activity that
generates monopoly proﬁts.
The following example formalizes this argument.4 The market value of the asset at
the purchase date is
MV0 =
E0[π1] + E0[MV1]
1 + r
,
where π1 is the actual proﬁt during the year, MV1 is the market value at the exit date,
r is the risk-adjusted discount rate (RADR), and all expected values are calculated only
using information available to the market at the entry date. If market values are used as
the entry and exit values, the ex post IRR i satisﬁes
MV0 =
π1 +MV1
1 + i
.
Since
(1 + r)MV0 = E0[π1] + E0[MV1]
and
(1 + i)MV0 = π1 +MV1,
the “excess proﬁt” equals
(i− r)MV0 = (π1 −E0[π1]) + (MV1 − E0[MV1]).
Thus, excess proﬁt equals the sum of (i) the random shock to planned proﬁt and (ii) the
random shock to the network’s market value at the exit date. Neither of these quantities
reveal anything about monopoly power.
IRR, monopoly profits, and replacement entry and exit values
We now show that if the hypothetical investor buys and sells the asset at its replacement
cost, the IRR approach is capable, in principle, of saying something about monopoly
proﬁts.5 However, we will see that practical implementation issues make it very unlikely
that anything much can actually be inferred. In particular, we will see that the noise
introduced by calculating ex post returns makes it almost impossible to reject the null
hypothesis that the ﬁrm is not making excess ex ante proﬁts.
4We use one period returns to simplify the presentation. Our results extend easily to multiple periods.
5Similar arguments would apply if depreciated historic cost was used instead of replacement cost.
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If the present value of future proﬁt ﬂows earned by the incumbent exceeds the re-
placement cost of its assets, then a rival ﬁrm could build an equivalent asset, earn lower
proﬁts, and still be ﬁnancially viable. With this in mind, a regulator might require the
ﬁrm to operate so that the present value of its future proﬁt ﬂows equals the replacement
cost of its assets, as if this is the competitive outcome. That is, expected future proﬁts
must satisfy
RC0 =
E0[π
∗
1]
1 + r
+
E0[π
∗
2]
(1 + r)2
+
E0[π
∗
3]
(1 + r)3
+ · · · ,
where r is the RADR, RC0 is the asset’s replacement cost at the entry date, and π
∗
n is
the proﬁt which the regulator would like the ﬁrm to make in year n. This condition can
be written in the form
RC0 =
E0[π
∗
1 ]
1 + r
+
1
1 + r
E0
[
E1[π
∗
2]
1 + r
+
E1[π
∗
3 ]
(1 + r)2
+ · · ·
]
,
making it clear that the regulator’s goal is for
RC0 =
E0[π
∗
1 ] + E0[RC1]
1 + r
, (1)
where RC1 is the replacement cost at the exit date.
From equation (1), the ex ante rate of return should equal r when replacement cost is
chosen for the entry and exit values. The ex post rate of return i satisﬁes
RC0 =
π1 +RC1
1 + i
.
The excess proﬁt therefore equals
(i− r)RC0 = (π1 − E0[π∗1 ]) + (RC1 − E0[RC1]),
which we can write as
(i− r)RC0 = E0[π1 − π∗1] + (π1 − E0[π1]) + (RC1 − E0[RC1]).
Thus, excess proﬁt equals the sum of (i) the excess proﬁt planned by the ﬁrm, (ii) the
random shock to planned proﬁt, and (iii) the random shock to the network’s replacement
cost. When assessing the existence of monopoly proﬁts, we are interested in the ﬁrst
component only. However, any calculation of ex post returns inevitably introduces the
other two components, so the ex post IRR is a noisy (potentially very noisy) indicator of
ex ante monopoly proﬁts.
If the ex post IRR is to be used to detect monopoly proﬁts, then detailed statistical
analysis needs to be performed. To reject the null hypothesis that ex ante excess proﬁts
are zero (that is, that E0[π1 − π∗1] = 0), the ex post excess proﬁts (that is, (i − r)RC0)
have to exceed some positive critical value. The larger the variance of the combined noise
term, the larger this critical value will be. And this variance is likely to be large. It seems
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reasonable to assume that the two shocks are positively correlated — if the economy is
booming, proﬁts will be higher than expected and the cost of replacing the asset may also
be high. If this is the case, then the variance of the combined noise term will be even
greater than the sum of the variances of the components. Consequently, it will be very
diﬃcult to reject the null hypothesis given the sample periods typically available.
Thus, while in principle the IRR approach based on replacement cost entry and exit
values can reveal something about monopoly proﬁts, in practice it is likely to tell us very
little.
Benchmark rates of return
Even if we could be conﬁdent that a high ex post IRR indicates a high ex ante expected
return, there still remains the problem of determining whether or not it is “too high”,
in the sense of exceeding the benchmark applicable to a comparable competitive ﬁrm.
Bertram et al. use two benchmarks: stock market returns and the weighted average
cost of capital (WACC). Speciﬁcally, they compare gas IRRs with (i) the actual IRR
of an investor who purchased the portfolio of NZSE40 stocks and held them over the
sample period of the study, (ii) the Ministry of Economic Development’s estimates of the
appropriate WACC for electricity lines companies (Bertram et al., 2001, p. 23), and (iii)
a WACC calculated using the Commerce Commission’s approach to estimating WACCs
for airﬁelds (Bertram et al., 2001, p. 24). For their study of port companies, the same
authors use the Ministry of Transport’s speciﬁed WACC (Bertram et al., 2002, p. 23). In
what circumstances are such benchmarks justiﬁed?
First, it is important to recognize that WACCs and stock market returns are market-
determined benchmarks, i.e., they are measures of the opportunities available to investors
who pay and receive market value for their assets. As a result, comparison of ex post
IRRs with these benchmarks makes sense if and only if the IRRs are calculated using
market values. But, as we have seen, the use of market entry and exit values means that
the ex post IRR calculation is incapable of shedding any light on the extent of monopoly
proﬁts.
Second, even if this problem is ignored, it is by no means clear that these benchmarks
represent fair ex ante rates of return. As is now widely recognized, a number of factors can
drive a wedge between the theoretical fair return and simple single-period measures such
as WACC: unsystematic risks and ﬁnancing constraints (e.g., Stulz, 1999), dynamic risks
and eﬃciency (e.g., Guthrie, Small and Wright, 2000), and growth and timing options
(e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Existing empirical evidence seems to support this idea:
Summers (1987) and Poterba and Summers (1995) report that unregulated ﬁrms use
investment benchmark returns up to three times as great as any possible WACC; Froot
(1999) ﬁnds that benchmark returns for investments with high unsystematic risk (but
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low systematic risk) such as catastrophe insurance frequently exceed 100%. In these
circumstances, an IRR of 17% (the IRR calculated by Bertram et al. (2001, p. 12) for
Natural Gas Corporation) does not seem too unusual.
Concluding remarks
We have three main reservations about the use of ex post IRRs to detect monopoly proﬁts.
Firstly, with market values used as entry and exit values, the ex post IRR cannot shed
any light on the existence or otherwise of monopoly proﬁts — it simply reveals whether
the ﬁrm did better or worse than the market expected at the entry date. Anticipated
monopoly proﬁts lead to a high market value now, not to returns being high over any
given future period.
Secondly, while using replacement cost as the entry and exit values can, in principle,
reveal something about monopoly proﬁts, in practice the resulting ex post IRR is likely
to tell us very little. If it is to be used to detect monopoly proﬁts, then detailed statistical
analysis needs to be performed. Since the ex post IRR is a noisy measure of ex ante
monopoly proﬁts, it will be very diﬃcult to reject the null hypothesis given the sample
periods typically available.
Finally, the typical benchmarks (stock market returns and WACCs) are market-
determined and therefore only comparable to IRRs calculated using market values —
a situation when the ex post IRR reveals nothing about monopoly proﬁts anyway. Fur-
thermore, there is ample empirical and theoretical evidence that these benchmarks do not
even represent fair rates of return.
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